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Abstract
There has been considerable recent interest in “cloud storage” wherein a user asks a server to
store a large file. One issue is whether the user can verify that the server is actually storing the file,
and typically a challenge-response protocol is employed to convince the user that the file is indeed
being stored correctly. The security of these schemes is phrased in terms of an extractor which will
recover the file given any “proving algorithm” that has a sufficiently high success probability. This
forms the basis of proof-of-retrievability (PoR) systems.
In this paper, we study multiple server PoR systems. Our contribution in multiple-server PoR
systems is as follows.
1. We formalize security definitions for two possible scenarios: (i) when a threshold of servers
succeed with high enough probability (worst-case) and (ii) when the average of the success
probability of all the servers is above a threshold (average-case). We also motivate the study
of confidentiality of the outsourced message.
2. We give MPoR schemes which are secure under both these security definitions and provide
reasonable confidentiality guarantees even when there is no restriction on the computational
power of the servers. We also show how classical statistical techniques used by Paterson, Stin-
son and Upadhyay (Journal of Mathematical Cryptology: 7(3)) can be extended to evaluate
whether the responses of the provers are accurate enough to permit successful extraction.
3. We also look at one specific instantiation of our construction when instantiated with the
unconditionally secure version of the Shacham-Waters scheme (Asiacrypt, 2008). This scheme
gives reasonable security and privacy guarantee. We show that, in the multi-server setting
with computationally unbounded provers, one can overcome the limitation that the verifier
needs to store as much secret information as the provers.
∗D. Stinson’s research is supported by NSERC discovery grant 203114-11
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1 Introduction
In the recent past, there has been a lot of activity on remote storage and the associated cryptographic
problem of integrity of the stored data. This question becomes even more important when there are
reasons to believe that the remote servers might act maliciously, i.e., one or more servers can delete
(whether accidentally or on purpose) a part of the data since there is a good chance that the data
will never be accessed and, hence, the client would never find out! In order to assuage such concerns,
one would prefer to have a simple auditing system that convinces the client if and only if the server
has the data. Such audit protocols, called proof-of-retrievability (PoR) systems, were introduced by
Juels and Kaliski [11], and closely related proof-of-data-possession (PDP) systems were introduced by
Ateniese et al. [2].
In a PoR protocol, a client stores a message m on a remote server and keeps only a short private
fingerprint locally. At some later time, when the client wishes to verify the integrity of its message,
it can run an audit protocol in which it acts as a verifier while the server proves that it has the
client’s data. The formal security of a PoR protocol is expressed in terms of an extractor – there
exists an extractor with (black-box or non-black box) access to the proving algorithm used by the
server to respond to the client’s challenge, such that the extractor retrieves the original message given
any adversarial server which passes the audits with a threshold probability. Apart from this security
requirement, two practical requirements of any PoR system would be to have a reasonable bound on
the communication cost of every audit and small storage overhead on both the client and server.
PoR systems were originally defined for the single-server setting. However, in the real world, it
is highly likely that a client would store its data on more than one server. This might be due to a
variety of reasons. For example, a client might wish to have a certain degree of redundancy if one
or more servers fails. In this case, the client is more likely to store multiple copies of the same data.
Another possible scenario could be that the client does not trust a single server with all of its data.
In this case, the client might distribute the data across multiple servers. Both of these settings have
been studied previously in the literature.
The first such study was initiated by Curtmola et al. [9], who considered the first of the above
two cases. They addressed the problem of storing copies of a single file on multiple servers. This is
an attractive solution considering the fact that replication is a fundamental principle in ensuring the
availability and durability of data. Their system allows the client to audit a subset of servers even if
some of them collude.
On the other hand, Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] considered the second of the above two cases.
They studied a system where the client’s data is distributed and stored on different servers. This
ensures that none of the servers has the whole data.
Both of these systems covered one specific instance of the wide spectrum of possibilities when
more than one servers is involved. For example, none of the works mentioned above addresses the
question of the privacy of data. Both of them argue that, for privacy, the client can encrypt its file
before storing it on the servers. These systems are secure only in the computational setting and the
privacy guarantee is dependent on the underlying encryption scheme. On the other hand, there are
known primitives in the setting of distributed systems, like secret sharing schemes, that are known to
be unconditionally secure. Moreover, we can also utilize cross-server redundancy to get more practical
systems.
1.1 Our Contributions
In Section 2, we give the formal description of multi-server PoR (MPoR) systems. We state the
definitions for worst-case and the average-case secure MPoR systems. We also motivate the privacy
requirement and state the privacy definition for MPoR systems. In Section 3, we define various
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primitives to the level required to understand this paper.
In Section 4, we give a construction of an MPoR scheme that achieves worst-case security when the
malicious servers are computationally unbounded. Our construction is based on ramp schemes and a
single-server PoR scheme. Our construction achieves confidentiality of the message. To exemplify our
scheme, we instantiate this scheme with a specific form of ramp scheme.
In Section 5, we give a construction of an MPoR scheme that achieves average-case security against
computationally unbounded adversaries. For an MPoR system that affords average-case security, we
also show that an extension of classical statistical techniques used by Paterson, Stinson and Upad-
hyay [16] can be used to provide a basis for estimating whether the responses of the servers are accurate
enough to allow successful extraction.
One of the benefits of an MPoR system is that it provides cross-server redundancy. In the past,
this feature has been used by Bowers et al. [8] to propose a multi-server system called HAIL. We first
note that the constructions in Section 4 and Section 5 do not provide any improvement on the storage
overhead of the server or the client. In Section 6, we give a construction based on the Shacham-Waters
protocol [17] that allows significant reduction of the storage overhead of the client in the multi-server
setting.
1.2 Related Works
The concept of proof-of-retrievability is due to Juels and Kaliski [11]. A PoR scheme incorporates a
challenge-response protocol in which a verifier can check that a message is being stored correctly, along
with an extractor that will actually reconstruct the message, given the algorithm of a “prover” who is
able to correctly respond to a sufficiently high percentage of challenges.
There are also papers that describe the closely related (but slightly weaker) idea of a proof-of-data-
possession scheme (PDP scheme), e.g., [2]. A PDP scheme permits the possibility that not all of the
message blocks can be reconstructed. Ateniese et al. [2] also introduced the idea of using homomorphic
authenticators to reduce the communication complexity of the system. This scheme was improved in
a follow-up work by Ateniese et al. [4]. Shacham and Waters [17] later showed that the scheme of
Ateniese et al. [1] can be transformed into a PoR scheme by constructing an extractor that extracts
the file from the responses of the Prover on the audits.
Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] extended the idea of Juels and Kaliski [11] and used error-correcting
codes. The main difference in their construction is that they use the idea of an “outer” and an “inner”
code (in the same vein as concatenated codes), to get a good balance between the extra storage
overhead and computational overhead in responding to the audits. Dodis, Vadhan, and Wichs [10]
provided the first example of an unconditionally secure PoR scheme, also constructed from an error-
correcting code, with extraction performed through list decoding in conjunction with the use of an
almost-universal hash function. They also give different constructions depending on the computational
capabilities of the server. Paterson et al. [16] studied PoR schemes in the setting of unconditional
security, and showed some close connections to error-correcting codes.
There have been some other works that provide proof-of-storage. Ateniese et al. [5] used homo-
morphic identification schemes to give efficient proof-of-storage systems. Wang et al. [20] gave the
first privacy preserving public auditable proof-of-storage systems. We refer the readers to the survey
by Kamara and Lauter [12] regarding the architecture of proof-of-storage systems.
Distributed Cloud Computing. Proof-of-storage systems have been also studied in the setting
where there is more than one server or more than one client. The first such setting was studied by
Curtmola et al. [9]. They studied a multiple replica PDP system, which is the natural generalization
of single server PDP system to t servers.
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Bowers et al. [8] introduced a distributed system that they called HAIL. Their system allows a
set of provers to prove the integrity of a file stored by a client. The idea in HAIL is to exploit the
cross-prover redundancy. They considered an active and mobile adversary that can corrupt the whole
set of provers.
Recently, Ateniese et al. [3] considered the problem from the client side, where n clients store their
respective files on a single prover in a manner such that the verification of the integrity of a single
client’s file simultaneously gives the integrity guarantee of the files of all the participating clients.
They called such a system an entangled cloud storage.
1.3 Comparison with Bowers, Juels, and Oprea
The scheme of Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] is closest to our work; however, there are some key
differences. We enumerate some of them below:
1. The construction of Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] is secure only in the computational setting,
while we provide security in the setting of unconditional security.
2. Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] use various tools and algorithms to construct their systems, includ-
ing error-correcting codes, pseudo-random functions, message authentication codes, and univer-
sal hash function families. On the other hand, we only use ramp schemes in our constructions,
making our schemes easier to state and analyze.
3. We consider two types of security guarantees – the worst-case scenario and the average-case
scenario (Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] only consider worst-case scenario).
4. The construction of Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [8] only aims to protect the integrity of the
message, while we consider both the privacy and integrity of the message.
5. We work under a stronger requirement than [8] – we require extraction to succeed with probability
equal to 1, whereas in [8], extraction succeeds with probability close to 1, depending in part on
properties of a certain class of hash functions used in the protocol.
We use the term Prover to identify any server that stores the file of a client. We use the term
Verifier for any entity that verifies whether the file of a client is stored properly or not by the server.
We also assume that a file is composed of message blocks of an appropriate fixed length. If the file
consists of single block, we simply call it the file.
2 Security Model of Multi-server PoR systems
The essential components of multi-server-PoR (MPoR) systems are natural generalizations of single-
server PoR systems. The first difference is that there are ρ provers and the Verifier might store different
messages on each of them. Also, during an audit phase, the Verifier can pick a subset of provers on
which it runs the audits. The last crucial difference is that the Extractor has (black-box or non-black-
box) access to a subset of proving algorithms corresponding to the provers that the Verifier picked to
audit. We detail them below for the sake of completeness.
Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be a set of ρ provers and let Verifier be the verifier. The Verifier has a
message m ∈M from the message space M which he redundantly encodes to M1, . . . ,Mρ.
1. In the keyed setting, the Verifier picks ρ different keys (K1, . . . ,Kρ), one for each of the corre-
sponding provers.
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2. The Verifier gives Mi to Proveri. In the case of a keyed scheme, Proveri may be also given an
additional tag Si generated using the key, Ki, and Mi.
3. The Verifier stores some sort of information (say a fingerprint of the encoded message) which
allows him to verify the responses made by the provers.
4. On receiving the encoded message Mi, Proveri generates a proving algorithm Pi, which it uses
to generate its responses during the auditing phase.
5. At any time, Verifier picks an index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ `, and engages in a challenge-response
protocol with Proveri. In one execution of challenge-response protocol, Verifier picks a challenge
c and gives it to Proveri, and the prover responds with %. The Verifier then verifies the correctness
of the response (based on its fingerprint).
6. The success probability succ(Pi) is the probability, computed over all the challenges, with which
the Verifier accepts the response sent by Proveri.
7. The Extractor is given a subset S of the proving algorithms P1, . . . ,Pρ (and in the case of a keyed
scheme, the corresponding subset of the keys, {Ki : i ∈ S}), and outputs a message m̂. The
Extractor succeeds if m̂ = m.
The above framework does not restrict any provers from interacting with other provers when they
receive the encoded message. However, we assume that they do not interact after they have generated
a proving algorithm. If we do not include this restriction, then it is not hard to see that one cannot
have any meaningful protocol. For example, if provers can interact after they receive the encoded
message, then it is possible that one prover stores the entire message and the other provers just relay
the challenges to this specific prover and relay back its response to the verifier.
In contrast to a single-prover PoR scheme, there are two possible ways in which one can define the
security of a multiple prover PoR system. We define them next.
The first security definition corresponds to the “worst case” scenario and is the natural general-
ization of a single-server PoR system.
Definition 1. A ρ-prover MPoR scheme is (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure if there is an Extractor which,
when given any τ proving algorithms, say Pi1 , . . .Piτ , succeeds with probability at least ν whenever
succ(Pj) ≥ η for all j ∈ I,
where I = {i1, . . . , iτ}.
We note that when ρ = τ = 1, we get a standard single-server PoR system. Moreover, the definition
captures the worst-case scenario in the sense that it only guarantees extraction if there exists a set of
τ proving algorithms, all of which succeed with high enough probability.
The above definition requires that all the τ servers succeed with high enough probability. On
the other hand, it might not be the case that all the proving algorithms of the servers picked by
the Verifier succeed with the required probability. In fact, even verifying whether or not all the
τ proving algorithms have high enough success probability to allow successful extraction might be
difficult (see, for example [16] for more details about this). However, it is possible that some of the
proving algorithms succeed with high enough probability to compensate for the failure of the rest of
the proving algorithms. For instance, since the provers are allowed to interact before they specify
their proving algorithms, it might be the case that the colluding provers decide to store most of the
message on a single prover. In this case, even a weaker guarantee that the average success probability
is high enough might be sufficient to guarantee a successful extraction. In other words, it is possible
to state (and as we show in this paper, achieve) a security guarantee with respect to the average case
success probability over all the proving algorithms.
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Definition 2. A ρ-prover MPoR scheme is (η, ν, ρ)-average secure if the Extractor succeeds with prob-
ability at least ν whenever
1
ρ
ρ∑
i=1
succ(Pi) ≥ η.
Note that the average-case secure system reduces to the standard PoR scheme (with τ = ρ) when
ρ = 1. The following example illustrates that average-case security is possible even when an MPoR
system is not possible as per Definition 1.
Example 2.1. Suppose η = 0.7, ν = 0 and ρ = 3. Further, suppose that succ(P1) = 0.9, succ(P2) =
0.6 and succ(P3) = 0.6. Then the hypotheses of Definition 1 are not satisfied for τ = 2. So even if
the MPoR scheme is (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure, we cannot conclude that the Extractor will succeed.
On the other hand, for the assumed success probabilities, the hypotheses of Definition 2 are satisfied.
Therefore, if the MPoR scheme is (0.7, ν, τ)-average secure, the Extractor will succeed.
Privacy Guarantee. We mentioned at the start of this section that PoR systems were introduced
and studied to give assurance of the integrity of the data stored on remote storage. However, the confi-
dentially aspects of data have not been studied formally in the area of cloud-based PoR systems. There
have been couple of ad hoc solutions that have been proposed in which the messages are encrypted
and then stored on the cloud [9]. We believe that, in addition to the standard integrity requirement,
privacy of the stored data when multiple provers are involved is also an important requirement. We
model the privacy requirement as follows:
Definition 3. An MPoR system is called t-private if no set A of adversarial provers of size at most
t learns anything about the message stored by the Verifier.
Note that t = 0 corresponds to the case when the MPoR system does not provide any confidentiality
to the message. The above definition captures the idea that, even if t provers collude, they do not
learn anything about the message. We remark that we can achieve confidentiality without encrypting
the message by using secret sharing techniques.
Notation. We fix the letter m for the original message, M to denote the space from which the
message m is picked, and M to denote the encoded message. We fix ν to denote the failure probability
of the extractor and η to denote the success probability of a proving algorithm. In this paper, we
are mainly interested in the case when ν = 0 for both the worst-case and the average-case security.
We use n to denote the number of message blocks, assuming the underlying PoR system breaks the
message into blocks.
3 Primitives Used in This Paper
3.1 Ramp Schemes
In our construction, we use a primitive related to secret sharing schemes known as ramp schemes.
A secret sharing scheme allows a trusted dealer to share a secret between n players so that certain
subsets of players can reconstruct the secret from the shares they hold [6, 18].
It is well-known that the size of each player’s share in a secret sharing scheme must be at least the
size of the secret. If the secret that is to be shared is large, then this constraint can be very restrictive.
Schemes for which we can get a certain form of trade-off between share size and security are known
as ramp schemes [7].
6
Definition 4. (Ramp Scheme). Let τ1, τ2, and n be positive integers such that τ1 < τ2 ≤ n. A
(τ1, τ2, n)-ramp scheme is a pair of algorithms: (ShareGen,Reconstruct) such that, on input a secret S,
ShareGen(S) generates n shares, one for each of the n players, such that the following two properties
hold: (i) Reconstruction: any subset of τ2 or more players can pool together their shares and use
Reconstruct to compute the secret S from the shares that they collectively hold, and (ii) Secrecy: no
subset of τ1 or fewer players can determine any information about the secret S.
Example 3.1. Suppose the dealer wishes to set up (2, 4, n)-ramp scheme with the secret (a0, a1). The
dealer picks a finite field Fq with q > n such that a0, a1 ∈ Fq. The dealer picks random elements a2, a3
independently from the field Fq and construct the following polynomial of degree 3 over the finite field
Fq: f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + a3x3. The share for any player Pi is generated by computing si = f(i).
It is easy to see that if two or fewer players come together, they do not learn any information about
the secret, and if at least four players come together, they can use Lagrange’s interpolation formula
to compute the function f as well as the secret. However, if three players pool together their shares,
then they can learn some partial information about one of the other player’s share. For concreteness,
let q = 17. Then 5a1 ≡ 7s3 + 9s6 + s15 mod 17; therefore, players P3,P6, and P15 can compute the
value of a1.
For completeness, we review some of the basic theory concerning the construction of ramp schemes.
Linear codes have been used to construct ramp-schemes for over thirty years since the work of McEliece
and Sarwate [14]. We will consider a construction from an arbitrary code in this paper. The following
relation between an arbitrary code (linear or non-linear) and a ramp scheme is was shown by Paterson
and Stinson [15].
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a code of length N , distance d and dual distance d⊥. Let 1 ≤ s < d⊥ − 2.
Then there is a (τ1, τ2, N − s) ramp scheme , where τ1 = d⊥ − s− 1 and τ2 = N − d + 1.
Here s is the rate of the ramp scheme. If G is a generator matrix of a code C of dimension k, then
|C| = qk ≥ qd⊥−1. In other words, k ≥ d⊥ − 1.
Construction 3.2. The construction of a ramp scheme from a code is as follows. Let s and ρ be
positive integers and let (m1, . . . ,ms) ∈ Fs be the message. Let C be a code of length n = ρ + s
defined over a finite field F. We also require that the first s entries of a codewords is the message to
be encoded, i.e., the corresponding generator matrix is in standard form. Select a random codeword
(c1 = m1, . . . , cs = ms, cs+1, . . . , cρ+s) ∈ C, and define the shares as (cs+1, . . . , cρ+s).
Example 3.2. One can use a Reed-Solomon code to construct a ramp scheme [14]. Let q be a prime
and 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n < q. It is well known that, for a prime q, there is an [N, k,N−τ+1]q Reed-Solomon
code with d⊥ = τ + 1. This implies a (τ − s, τ,N)-ramp scheme over Fq.
3.2 Single-prover PoR-system
We start by fixing some notation for PoR schemes that we use throughout the paper. Let Γ be the
challenge space and ∆ be the response space. We denote by γ = |Γ| the size of a challenge space.
Let M∗ be the space of all encoded messages. The response function ρ :M∗ × Γ → ∆ computes the
response r = ρ(M, c) given the encoded message M and the challenge c.
For an encoded message M ∈M∗, we define the response vector rM that contains all the responses
to all possible challenges for the encoded message M . Finally, define the response code of the scheme
to be
R = {rM : M ∈M∗}.
The codewords in R are just the response vectors that we defined above. Paterson et al. [16] proved
the following result for a single-prover PoR scheme.
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1. On input P, compute the vector R′ = (r′c : c ∈ Γ), where r′c = P(c) for all
c ∈ Γ (i.e., for every c, r′c is the response computed by P when it is given the
challenge c).
2. Find M̂ ∈M∗ so that dist(R′, rM̂ ) is minimised.
3. Output m̂ = e−1(M̂).
Figure 1: Extractor for Theorem 3.3
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for a PoR scheme with response code R. If the
success probability of the corresponding proving algorithm satisfies succ(P) ≥ 1− d˜/2γ, where d˜ is the
Hamming distance of the code R and γ is the size of the challenge space, then the extractor described
in Figure 1 always outputs the message m.
If we cast this in the security model defined in Section 1 (Definition 1 and Definition 2), then we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for a single server PoR scheme with response
code R. Then there exists a (1− d˜/2γ, 0, 1, 1)-MPoR system, where d˜ is the Hamming distance of the
code R and γ is the size of the challenge space Γ.
Paterson et al. [16] gave a modified version of the Shacham-Waters scheme which they showed
is secure in the unconditional security setting. They argued that, in the setting of unconditionally
security, any keyed PoR scheme should be considered to be secure when the success probability of the
proving algorithm P, denoted by succ(P), is defined as the average success probability of the prover
over all possible keys (Theorem 3.5). The same reasoning extends to MPoR systems. Therefore, in
what follows and in Section 6, when we say a scheme is an (η, ν, τ, ρ)-threshold secure scheme, the
term η is the average success probability where the average is computed over all possible keys. We
denote the average success probability of a prover P over all possible keys by succavg(P). Paterson et
al. [16] showed the following:
Theorem 3.5. Let Fq be the underlying field and let ` ≥ 1 be the hamming weight of the challenges
made by the Verifier. Let d be the hamming distance of the space of encoded message, M∗. Suppose
that
succavg(P) & 1− d
∗(q − 1)
2γq
, (1)
where γ = qn is the size of the challenge space and d∗ is given by
d∗ ≈
(
n
`
)
(q − 1)` −
(
n− d
`
)
(q − 1)` −
∑
w≥1
(
d
w
)(
n− d
`− w
)
(q − 1)`
q
. (2)
Then there exists an Extractor that always output m̂ = m.
4 Worst-case MPoR Based on Ramp Scheme
In this section, we give our first construction that achieves a worst-case security guarantee. The
idea is to use a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme in conjunction with a single-server-PoR system. The intuition
behind the construction is that the underlying PoR system along with the ramp scheme provides the
retrievability guarantee and the ramp scheme provides the confidentiality guarantee.
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Message in the form of s bits
Share 1 of
Ramp scheme
Share i of
Ramp scheme
Share ρ of
Ramp scheme
Block stored
on Prover1
Block stored
on Proveri
Block stored
on Proverρ
Π Π Π
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Figure 2: Schematic View of Ramp-MPoR System
We first present a schematic diagram of the working of an MPoR in Figure 2 and illustrate the
scheme with the help of following example. We provide the details of the construction in Figure 3.
Example 4.1. Let ρ = 6. Suppose the Verifier and the provers use a PoR system Π. Let the message to
be stored be (15, 3). The Verifier picks q = 17 and chooses two random elements 1, 2 ∈ F17 to construct
a polynomial f(x) = 15 + 3x+ x2 + 2x3. The Verifier picks an encoding function e(·) and stores e(4)
on Prover1, e(7) on Prover2, e(2) on Prover3, e(1) on Prover4, e(16) on Prover5, and e(8) on Prover6.
Let us suppose that the PoR scheme is such that, for a random challenge vector of dimension ρ,
say
(
5, 2, 9, 13, 5, 6
)
, where the i-th entry would be a challenge to Proveri, the corresponding
responses of the provers form a vector
(
3, 14, 1, 13, 12, 14
)
, where the Respi is the correct
response of the Proveri. In other words, on challenge 5 to Prover1, the correct response is 3, and so
on.
During the audit phase, the Verifier picks any four provers and sends the challenges to the provers.
Once all the provers that he chose reply, he verifies their response. For example, suppose the Verifier
picks Prover1, Prover3, Prover4, and Prover6. The Verifier then sends the challenge 5 to Prover1, 9
to Prover3, 13 to Prover4, and 6 to Prover6. If it gets the response 3, 1, 13, and 14 back, it accepts;
otherwise, it rejects.
We note one of the possible practical deployments of the Ramp-MPoR stated in Figure 3. Let m
be a message that consists of sk elements from Fq. The Verifier breaks the message into k blocks of
length s each. It then invokes a (τ1, τ2, n)-Ramp scheme on each of these blocks to generate n shares
of each of the k blocks. The Verifier then runs a PoR scheme Π to compute the encoded message to
be stored on each of the servers by encoding its k shares, one corresponding to each of the k blocks.
We prove the following security result for the MPoR scheme presented in Figure 3.
Theorem 4.1. Let Π be an (η, 0, 1, 1)- threshold-secure MPoR with a response code of Hamming
distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ. Let Ramp = (ShareGen,Reconstruct) be a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp
scheme. Then Ramp-MPoR, defined in Figure 3, is an MPoR system with the following properties:
1. Privacy: Ramp-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: Ramp-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜/2γ.
Proof. The privacy guarantee of Ramp-MPoR is straightforward from the privacy property of the
underlying ramp scheme.
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Input: The Verifier gets the message m as input. Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ be the
set of ρ provers.
Initialization Stage. The Verifier performs the following steps for storing the mes-
sage
1. The Verifier chooses a single-server PoR system Π and a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp
scheme Ramp = (ShareGen,Reconstruct).
2. The Verifier computes ρ shares of the message using the ramp scheme
(m1, . . . ,mρ)← ShareGen(m).
3. The Verifier runs ρ independent copies of Π and generates the encoded
share Mi = e(mi) ∈M corresponding to each 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ.
4. The Verifier stores Mi on Proveri.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier picks a prover, Proveri, and
runs the challenge-response protocol of Π with Proveri.
Figure 3: Worst-case Secure MPoR Using a Ramp-scheme (Ramp-MPoR).
For the security guarantee, we need to demonstrate an Extractor that outputs a message m̂ = m
if at least t servers succeed with probability at least η = 1− d˜/2γ. The description of our Extractor is
as follows:
1. Extractor chooses τ2 provers and runs the extraction algorithm of the underlying single-server
PoR system on each of these provers. In the end, it outputs M̂ij for the corresponding provers
Proverij . It defines S ← {M̂i1 , . . . , M̂iτ2}.
2. Extractor invokes the Reconstruct algorithm of the underlying ramp scheme with the elements of
S. It outputs whatever Reconstruct outputs.
Now note that the Verifier interacts with every Proveri independently. We know from the security of
the underlying single-server-PoR scheme (Theorem 3.3) that there is an extractor that always outputs
the encoded message whenever succ(Pi) ≥ η. Therefore, if all the τ2 chosen proving algorithms succeed
with probability at least η, then the set S will have τ2 correct shares. From the correctness of the
Reconstruct algorithm, we know that the message output in the end by Extractor will be the message
m.
As a special case of the above, we get a simple MPoR system which uses a replication code. A
replication code has an encoding function Enc : Λ→ Λρ such that Enc(x) = (x, x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ times
) for any x ∈ Λ.
This is the setting considered by Curtmola et al. [9].
We call a Ramp-MPoR scheme based on a replication code a Rep-MPoR. The schematic description
of the scheme is presented in Figure 4 and the scheme is presented in Figure 5. Since a ρ-replication
code is a (0, 1, ρ)-ramp scheme, a simple corollary to Theorem 4.1 is the following.
Corollary 4.2. Let Π be a (η, 0, 1, 1)-MPoR system with a response code of Hamming distance d˜
and the size of challenge space γ. Then Rep-MPoR, formed by instantiating Ramp-MPoR with the
replication code based Ramp scheme, is a MPoR system with the following properties:
1. Privacy: It is 0-private.
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e
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on Prover1
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Figure 4: Schematic View of Rep-MPoR
2. Security: It is (η, 0, 1, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜/2γ.
The issue with Rep-MPoR scheme is that there is no confidentiality of the file. We will come back
to this issue later in Section 6.1.
5 Average-case Secure MPoR System
In general, it is not possible to verify with certainty whether the success probability of a proving
algorithm is above a certain threshold; therefore, in that case, it is unclear how the Extractor would
know which proving algorithms to use for extraction as described in Section 4. In this section, we
analyze the average-case security properties of the replication code based scheme, Rep-MPoR, described
in the last section. This allows us an alternative guarantee that allows successful extraction where the
extractor need not worry whether a certain proving algorithm succeeds with high enough probability
or not.
Recall the scenario introduced in Example 2.1. Here we assumed succ(P1) = 0.9, succ(P2) = 0.6
and succ(P3) = 0.6 for three provers. Suppose that successful extraction for a particular prover Pi
requires succ(P2) ≥ 0.7. Then extraction would work on only one of these three provers. On the other
hand, suppose we have an average-case secure MPoR in which extraction is successful if the average
success probability of the three provers is at least 0.7. Then the success probabilities assumed above
would be sufficient to guarantee successful extraction.
Theorem 5.1. Let Π be a single-server PoR system with a response code of Hamming distance d˜
and the size of challenge space γ. Then Rep-MPoR, defined in Figure 5, is an MPoR system with the
following properties:
1. Privacy: Rep-MPoR is 0-private.
2. Security: Rep-MPoR is (1− d˜/2γ, 0, ρ)-average secure.
Proof. Since the message is stored in its entirety on each of the servers, there is no confidentiality.
For the security guarantee, we need to demonstrate an Extractor that outputs a message m̂ = m if
average success probability of all the provers is at least η = 1− d˜/2γ. The description of our Extractor
is as follows:
1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, use Pi to compute the vector Ri = (r(i)c : c ∈ Γ), where r(i)c = Pi(c) for all
c ∈ Γ (i.e., for every c, r(i)c is the response computed by Pi when it is given the challenge c),
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Input: The verifier Verifier gets the message m as input. Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ
be the set of ρ provers.
Initialization Stage. The Verifier performs the following steps for storing the mes-
sage
1. The Verifier chooses a single-server PoR system Π.
2. Using the encoding scheme of Π, the Verifier generates the encoded mes-
sage M = e(m) ∈M for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. The Verifier stores the message M on all Proveri for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier runs the challenge-response
protocol of Π independently on each server.
Figure 5: Average case Secure MPoR (Rep-MPoR).
2. Compute R as a concatenation of R1, . . . , Rρ and find M̂ :=
(
M̂1, . . . , M̂ρ
)
so that dist(R, rM̂ )
is minimized, and
3. Compute m = e−1(M̂).
Now note that Verifier interacts with each Proveri independently and Extractor uses the challenge-
response step with independent challenges. Let η1, . . . , ηρ be the success probabilities of the ρ proving
algorithms. Let η¯ be the average success probability over all the servers and challenges. Therefore,
η¯ = ρ−1
∑ρ
i=1 ηi.
First note that, in the case of Figure 5, the response code is of the form(r, r, . . . , r︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ times
) : r ∈ R
 .
It is easy to see that the distance of the response code is ρd˜ and the length of a challenge is ργ.
From the definition of the extractor and Theorem 3.3, it follows that the extraction succeeds if
η1 + . . .+ ηρ
ρ
= η¯ ≥ 1− d˜
2γ
.
5.1 Hypothesis Testing for Rep-MPoR
For the purposes of auditing whether a file is being stored appropriately, it is necessary to have a
mechanism for determining whether the success probability of a prover is sufficiently high. In the case
of replication code based MPoR with worst-case security, we are interested in the success probabilities
of individual provers, and the analysis can be carried out as detailed in Paterson et al. [16]. In the
case of Rep-MPoR, however, we wish to determine whether the average success probability of the set
of provers {P1,P2, . . . ,Pρ} is at least η. This amounts to distinguishing the null hypothesis
H0 : avg-succ(Pi) < η
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from the alternative hypothesis
H1 : avg-succ(Pi) ≥ η.
Suppose we send c challenges to each server. If a given server Pi has success probability succ(Pi),
then the number of correct responses received follows the binomial distribution B(c, succ(Pi)). If the
success probabilities succ(Pi) were the same for each server, then the sum of the number of successes
over all the servers would also follow a binomial distribution. However, we are also interested in the
case in which these success probabilities differ, in which case the total number of successes follows a
poisson-binomial distribution, which is more complicated to work with. In order to establish a test
that is conceptually and computationally easier to apply, we will instead rely on the observation that,
in cases where the average success probability is high enough to permit extraction, the failure rates of
the servers are relatively low.
For a given server Pi, let fi = 1− succ(Pi) denote the probability of failure. For r challenges, the
number of failures follows the binomial distribution B(c, fi). Provided that r is sufficiently large and fi
is sufficiently low, then B(c, fi) can be approximated by the poisson distribution Pois(cfi). The poisson
distribution Pois(λ) is used to model the scenario where discrete events are occurring independently
within a given time period with an expected rate of λ events during that period. The probability of
observing k events within that period is given by
P (k) =
e−λλk
k!
.
The mean and the variance of Pois(λ) is equal to λ. For our purposes, the advantage of using this
approximation is the fact that the sum of ρ independent variables following the poisson distributions
Pois(λ1),Pois(λ2), . . . ,Pois(λρ) is itself distributed according to the poisson distribution Pois(λ1 +
λ2 + . . . + λρ), even when the λi all differ. In the case where the average failure probability is low,
the distribution Pois(c(f1 + f2 + . . . + fρ)) should provide a reasonable approximation to the actual
distribution of the total number of failed challenges.
Example 5.1. To demonstrate the appropriateness of the Poisson approximation for this application,
suppose we have five servers, whose failure probabilities are expressed as f = (f1, f2, . . . , f5). Let t be
the number of trials per server and b the total number of observed failures out of the 5t trials. Table 1
give both the exact cumulative probability Pr[B ≤ b] of observing up to b failures, and the Poisson
approximation PrPois[B ≤ b] of this cumulative probability, for a range of values for f .
Table 1: Comparison Between Exact Cumulative Probability
and Approximation by Poisson Distribution
f = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 2.556545692× 10−38 3.261456422× 10−36
200 10 1.450898832× 10−32 1.137687971× 10−30
200 50 5.995167631× 10−9 2.401592276× 10−8
200 100 0.5265990813 0.5265622074
100 0 1.322070819× 10−23 1.928749864× 10−22
100 5 6.272915577× 10−17 5.567756307× 10−16
100 10 1.135691814× 10−12 6.450152972× 10−12
100 15 1.662665039× 10−9 6.357982164× 10−9
100 20 4.557480806× 10−7 0.000001235187232
Continued on next page . . .
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200 0 1.747871252× 10−46 3.720076039× 10−44
200 5 2.556545692× 10−38 3.261456422× 10−36
200 10 1.450898832× 10−32 1.137687971× 10−30
200 15 6.757345217× 10−28 3.340076418× 10−26
200 20 5.962487876× 10−24 1.905558774× 10−22
500 20 1.240463044× 10−84 1.084188102× 10−79
500 25 3.140367419× 10−79 1.697380630× 10−74
500 30 2.935666094× 10−74 9.912214279× 10−70
500 35 1.193158517× 10−69 2.542280876× 10−65
500 40 2.369596756× 10−65 3.218593843× 10−61
f = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 0.06613951161 0.06708596299
200 10 0.5830408032 0.5830397512
200 20 0.9985035184 0.9984117410
200 50 ≈ 1 ≈ 1
f = (0.2, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 9.651421837× 10−22 6.180223643× 10−20
200 10 5.539867010× 10−17 1.744235672× 10−15
200 20 0.09020056729 0.1076778797
200 50 0.9999999198 0.9999991415
f = (0.01, 0.01, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
200 5 8.312224722× 10−8 1.196952269× 10−7
200 10 0.00006809921297 0.00008550688580
200 20 0.06901537242 0.07274102693
200 50 0.9999582547 0.9999397284
f = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
20 0 0.00002656139888 0.00004539992984
20 5 0.05757688648 0.06708596299
20 10 0.5831555123 0.5830397512
20 15 0.9601094730 0.9512595983
20 20 0.9991924263 0.9984117410
40 0 7.055079108× 10−10 2.061153629× 10−9
40 5 0.00003871193246 0.00007190884076
40 10 0.008071249954 0.01081171886
40 15 0.1430754340 0.1565131351
40 20 0.5591747822 0.5590925860
100 20 4.557480806× 10−7 0.000001235187232
100 25 0.00003540113222 0.00007160717427
100 30 0.001002549708 0.001594027332
100 35 0.01231948910 0.01621388016
100 40 0.07508928967 0.08607000083
20 0 0.3660323413 0.3678794412
Continued on next page . . .
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20 5 0.9994654657 0.9994058153
20 10 0.9999999939 0.9999999900
20 15 1.000000000 1.000000000
20 20 1.000000000 1.000000000
40 0 0.1339796748 0.1353352833
40 5 0.9839770930 0.9834363920
40 10 0.9999931182 0.9999916922
40 15 0.9999999996 1.000000000
40 20 0.9999999999 1.000000000
100 20 0.9999999367 0.9999999198
100 25 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 30 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 35 0.9999999999 1.000000001
100 40 0.9999999999 1.000000001
f = (0.02, 0.0075, 0.0075, 0.0075, 0.0075)
t b Pr[B ≤ b] PrPois[B ≤ b]
20 0 0.08936904038 0.09536916225
20 5 0.9712600336 0.9672561739
20 10 0.9999843669 0.9999642885
20 15 0.9999999995 0.9999999958
20 20 1.000000000 1.000000000
40 0 0.007986825382 0.009095277109
40 5 0.6699740391 0.6684384858
40 10 0.9927425867 0.9909776597
40 15 0.9999835852 0.9999661876
40 20 0.9999999935 0.9999999715
100 20 0.9999999935 0.9999999715
100 25 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 30 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 35 0.9999999998 1.000000001
100 40 0.9999999998 1.000000001
As an example of using the given formula to calculate a confidence interval, suppose we do 200
trials on each of five servers (so there are 1000 trials in total) and we observe 50 failures in total. Then
the resulting confidence interval is [0, 63.29). Suppose we wish to know whether the success probability
is at least η = 0.9. We have (1 − 0.9) × 1000 = 100. This is outside of that interval, and hence we
conclude there is enough evidence to reject H0 at the 95% significance level. However, to test whether
the success probability was greater than 0.95 we see that (1− 0.95)× 1000 = 50. Since 50 lies within
the interval, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to reject H0 at the 95% significance level.
Let b denote the number of incorrect responses we have received from the cρ challenges given to
the provers. Suppose that H0 is true, so that the expected number of failures is at least ηρc. Based
on our approximation, the probability that the number of failures is at most b is at most
b∑
i=0
e−ηρc(ηρc)i
i!
.
If this probability is less than 0.05, we reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis. However, if the
probability is greater than 0.05, then there is not enough evidence to reject H0 at the 5% significance
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level, and so we continue to suspect that the file is not being stored appropriately.
We can express this test neatly using a confidence interval. We define a 95% upper confidence
bound by
λU = inf
{
λ
∣∣∣∣∣
b∑
i=0
e−λλi
i!
< 0.05
}
.
This represents the smallest parameter choice for the Poisson distribution for which the probability
of obtaining b or fewer incorrect responses is less than 0.05. Then [0, λU ) is a 95% confidence interval
for the mean number of failures, so we reject H0 whenever ηnr lies outside this interval. The value
of λU can be determined easily by exploiting a connection with the chi-squared distribution [19]: we
have that
b∑
i=0
e−λλi
i!
= Pr(χ22b+2 > 2λ),
and so the appropriate value of λU can readily be obtained from a table for the chi-squared distribution.
6 Optimization Using the Keyed Shacham-Waters Scheme
In the last three sections, we gave constructions of MPoR scheme using ramp-schemes, linear secret-
sharing schemes, replication codes, and a single-prover-PoR system. In this section, we show a specific
instantiation of our scheme using the keyed-scheme of Shacham and Waters [16, 17] for a single server
PoR system.
6.1 Extension of the Keyed Shacham-Waters Scheme to MPoR
If we instantiate the Rep-MPoR scheme (described in Section 4) with the modified Shacham-Waters
scheme of Paterson et al. [16], then we need one key that consists of n + 1 values in Fq. However, in
this case, we do not have any privacy. In particular, we have the following extension of Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 6.1. Let Π be an (η, 0, 0, 1)-PoR system of Shacham and Waters [17] with a response
code of Hamming distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ (where d˜ is given by equation (2)).
Then Rep-MPoR instantiated with the Shacham-Waters scheme is an MPoR system with the following
properties:
1. Privacy: It is 0-private.
2. Security: It is (η, 0, 1, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: Verifier needs to store n + 1 field elements and every Proveri needs to store
2n field elements.
Proof. The results follow by combining Theorem 3.5 with Corollary 4.2.
The issue with the Rep-MPoR scheme is that there is no confidentiality of the file. In what follows,
we improve the privacy guarantee of the MPoR scheme described above. Our starting point would be
an instantiation of the Ramp-MPoR scheme, defined in Figure 3, with the Shacham-Waters scheme.
We then reduce the storage on the Verifier through two steps.
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6.2 Optimized Version of the Multi-server Shacham-Waters Scheme
We follow two steps to get a MPoR scheme based on the Shacham-Waters scheme with a reduced
storage requirement for the Verifier, while improving the confidentiality guarantee.
1. In the first step, stated in Theorem 6.2, we improve the privacy guarantee of the MPoR scheme
to get a τ1-private MPoR scheme (where τ1 < ρ is an integer). The Verifier in this scheme
has to store ρ(n + 1) field elements. When the underlying field is Fq, the verifier has to store
ρ(n+ 1) log q bits.
2. In the second step, stated in Theorem 6.3, we reduce the storage requirement of the Verifier
from ρ(n + 1) to τ1(n + 1) field elements for some integer τ1 < ρ without affecting the privacy
guarantee. When the underlying field is Fq, the verifier has to store τ1(n+ 1) log q bits.
Step 1. To improve the privacy guarantee of Corollary 6.1 to say, τ1-private (as per Definition 3),
we use a Ramp-MPoR scheme and ρ different keys, where each key consists of n+ 1 values in Fq. The
Verifier generates ρ shares of every message block using a ramp scheme, then encodes the shares, and
finally computes the tag for each of these encoded shares.
We follow with more details. Let m = (m[1], . . . ,m[k]) be the message. The Verifier computes
the shares of every message block (m[1], . . . ,m[k]) using a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-Ramp scheme. It then encodes
all the shares using the encoding scheme of the PoR scheme. Let the resulting encoded shares be
Mi[1], . . . ,Mi[n] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ. In other words, the result of the above two steps are ρ encoded shares,
each of which is an n-tuple in (Fq)n. The Verifier now picks random values a(i), b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n ∈ Fq for
1 ≤ i ≤ ρ and computes the tags as follows:
Si[j] = b
(i)
j + a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The verifier gives Proveri the tuple of encoded messages (Mi[1], . . . ,Mi[n]) and the corresponding
tags (Si[1], . . . , Si[n]). We call this scheme the Basic-MPoR scheme. The following is straightforward
from Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 6.2. Let Π be an (η, 0, 0, 1)-PoR scheme of Shacham and Waters [17] with a response code
of Hamming distance d˜ and the size of challenge space γ = qn (where d˜ is given by equation (2)).
Let Ramp be a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme. Then Basic-MPoR defined above is an MPoR scheme with the
following properties:
1. Privacy: Basic-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: Basic-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: The Verifier needs to store ρ(n+ 1) field elements and every Proveri needs to
store 2n field elements.
In the construction mentioned above, the Verifier needs to store ρ(n+ 1) elements of Fq, which is
almost the same as the total storage requirements of all the provers. The same issue was encountered
by Paterson et al. [16], where the Verifier has to store as much secret information as the size of the
message. This seems to be the general drawback in the unconditionally secure setting. However, in
the case of MPoR, we can improve the storage requirement of the Verifier as shown in the next step.
17
Step 2. In this step, we improve the above-described MPoR scheme to achieve considerable reduc-
tion on the storage requirement of the Verifier. The resulting scheme also provides unbounded audit
capability against computationally unbounded adversarial provers, and it also ensures τ1-privacy.
The main observation that results in the reduction in the storage requirements of the Verifier is
the fact that we can partially derandomize the keys generated by the Verifier. We use one of the
most common techniques in derandomization. The keys in this scheme are generated by τ1-wise
independent functions.1 Our construction works as follows: we pick n + 1 random polynomials,
f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x) ∈ Fq[x], each of degree at most τ1− 1. Then the Verifier computes the secret key
by evaluating the polynomials fj(x) and g(x) on ρ different values, say
b
(i)
j = fj(i) and ai = g(i)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ. The Verifier then computes the encoded shares and their corresponding
tags as in Basic-MPoR, i.e.,
Si[j] = b
(i)
j + a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Figure 6 is the formal description of this scheme. For the scheme described in Figure 6, we prove
the following result.
Theorem 6.3. Let Ramp = (ShareGen, Reconstruct) be a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme. Let Π be a single-
prover Shacham-Waters scheme [17] with a response code of Hamming distance d˜ and the size of
challenge space γ. Then SW-MPoR, defined in Figure 6, is an MPoR system with the following prop-
erties:
1. Privacy: SW-MPoR is τ1-private.
2. Security: SW-MPoR is (η, 0, τ2, ρ)-threshold secure, where η = 1− d˜(q−1)2γq .
3. Storage Overhead: Verifier needs to store τ1(n+1) field elements and every Proveri (for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ)
needs to store 2n field elements.
Proof. The privacy guarantee of SW-MPoR is straightforward from the secrecy property of the under-
lying ramp scheme.
For the security guarantee, we have to show an explicit construction of Extractor, that on input
proving algorithms P1, . . . ,Pρ, outputs m if succ(Pi) > η for at least τ2 proving algorithms. However,
there is a subtle issue that we have to deal with before using the proof of Theorem 4.1, because of
the relation between every message and tag pair. It was noted by Paterson et al. [16] that, if the
adversarial prover learns the secret key, then it can break the PoR scheme. We first argue that a set
of τ1 colluding provers cannot have an undue advantage from exploiting the linear structure of the
message-tag pairs.
We now prove that any set of τ1 provers do not learn anything about the keys generated using n+1
polynomials of degree at most τ1 − 1. The idea is very similar to the single-prover case. Paterson et
al. [16] noted that in the single prover case, for an n-tuple encoded message, the key is a tuple of n+ 1
uniformly random elements (a, b1, . . . , bn) in Fq. Further, from the point of view of a prover, there
are q possible keys – the value of a determines the n-tuple (b1, . . . , bn) uniquely, but a is completely
undetermined. In the MPoR case, we have ρ keys. Each prover in a given set of τ1 provers has q possible
keys, as discussed above. However, it is conceivable that they can use their collective knowledge to
1A function is a τ1-wise independent function if every subset of τ1 outputs is independent and equally likely. It should
be noted that this does not imply that all the outputs of the function are mutually independent.
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Input: The Verifier gets a message m = (m[1], . . . ,m[n]) as input. Let Prover1, . . . ,Proverρ
be the set of ρ provers. Let q be a prime number greater than ρ.
Initialization Stage: The Verifier performs the following steps
1. The Verifier choses n + 1 random polynomials of degree at most τ1 −
1, f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x) ∈ Fq[x] and a (τ1, τ2, ρ)-ramp scheme Ramp =
(ShareGen,Reconstruct).
2. For every server i, the Verifier does the following:
(a) Compute ρ shares of every message block using the share generation algo-
rithm of Ramp as follows: (m1[j], . . . ,mρ[j]) ← ShareGen(m[j]) for 1 ≤ j ≤
n.
(b) The Verifier encodes the message as e(mi[j]) = Mi[j] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ.
(c) Compute b
(i)
1 = f1(i), . . . , b
(i)
n = fn(i), a
(i) = g(i).
(d) Compute the tag Si[j] = b
(i)
j + a
(i)Mi[j] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
3. The Verifier gives {(Mi[j], Si[j])}1≤j≤n to Proveri.
Challenge Phase: During the audit phase, Verifier picks a prover, Proveri, and runs the
challenge-response algorithm of a single-server Shacham-Waters scheme. It computes
the corresponding keys by computing the random polynomials chosen during the set
up phase.
Figure 6: MPoR Using Optimized Shacham-Waters scheme (SW-MPoR).
learn something about the keys. In what follows, we show that they cannot determine any additional
information about their keys by combining the information they hold collectively.
Let I = {i1, . . . , iτ1} be the indices of any arbitrary set of τ1 provers. Let Si denote the set of
possible keys for Proveri, for i ∈ I. Consider any list of τ1 keys (Ki1 ,Ki2 , . . . ,Kiτ1 ). Recall that Ki (for
i ∈ I) has the form
(
a(i), b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n
)
, where a(i) and b
(i)
j (for 1 ≤ j ≤ n) are generated by random
polynomials of degree τ1. We first consider a
(i) (for i ∈ I). Note that the vector
(
b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
n
)
is
defined uniquely by a(i) and the set of all encoded message-tag pairs. We have already shown that
any set of τ1 provers cannot learn anything about the random polynomial g(x) used to generate the
a(i) for all i ∈ I. We use the following well-known fact to show the any set of τ1 provers do not learn
any additional information about the keys.
Fact 6.4. Let t > 0 be an integer, let q be a prime number, and let Fq be a finite field. Let
h0, h1, . . . , ht−1 ∈ Fq be random elements picked uniformly at random. Define h(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 hix
i
for all α ∈ Fq. Then,
Pr [h (x1) = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ h (xτ ) = yt] =
t∏
i=1
Pr [h(xαi) = yi] . (3)
Since h(x) is uniformly distributed in Fq, the probability computed in equation (3) is actually equal to
q−t.
By construction, g(x) is a random polynomial of degree at most τ1− 1. Fact 6.4 then implies that
any combination of
{
a(i)
}
i∈I is equally likely. A similar argument, with the a
(i)’s replaced by the b
(i)
j ’s
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(for all i ∈ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ n) and the polynomial g(x) replaced by fj(x) (for 1 ≤ j ≤ n), gives that all
set of τ1 keys are equally likely. In other words, the set of provers in the set I cannot determine any
additional information about their keys by combining the information they hold collectively.
We now complete the security proof by describing an Extractor that outputs the file if τ2 provers
succeed with high enough probability. The description of the Extractor and its analysis is same as that
of Theorem 4.1. We give it for the sake of completeness.
1. Extractor chooses τ2 provers and runs the extraction algorithm of the underlying single-server
PoR system on each of these provers. In the end, it outputs M̂ij for the corresponding provers
Proverij . It defines S ← {m̂i1 , . . . , m̂iτ2}. Note that the Extractor of the underlying PoR scheme
has already computed e−1 on the set
{
M̂i1 , . . . , M̂iτ2
}
.
2. Extractor invokes the Reconstruct algorithm of the underlying ramp scheme with the elements of
S˜ to compute m′.
Now note that the Verifier interacts with every Proveri independently. We know from the security
of the underlying PoR scheme of Shacham-Waters that there is an extractor that always outputs the
encoded message whenever succavg(Pi) ≥ η. Therefore, if all the τ2 chosen proving algorithms succeed
with probability at least η over all possible keys, then the set S will have τ2 correct shares. From the
correctness of the Reconstruct algorithm and e−1(·), we know that the message output in the end by
the Extractor will be the message m.
For the storage requirement, the Verifier has to store the coefficients of all the random polynomials
f1(x), . . . , fn(x), g(x), which amounts to a total of τ1(n+ 1) = τ1n+ n field elements.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied PoR systems when multiple provers are involved (MPoR). We motivated
and defined the security of MPoR in the worst-case (Definition 1) and the average-case (Definition 2)
settings, and extended the hypothesis testing techniques used in the single-server setting [16] to the
multi-server setting. We also motivated the study of confidentiality of the outsourced message. We
gave MPoR schemes which are secure under both these security definitions and provide reasonable
confidentiality guarantees even when there is no restriction on the computational power of the servers.
In the end of this paper, we looked at an optimized version of MPoR system when instantiated with
the unconditionally secure version of the Shacham-Waters scheme [17]. We exhibited that, in the
multi-server setting with computationally unbounded provers, one can overcome the limitation that
the verifier needs to store as much secret information as the provers.
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c challenge
C⊥ dual of a code C
d∗ distance of the response code
d distance of a codeword
d⊥ dual distance of a code
dist hamming distance between two vectors
G generator matrix of a code
k length of a message
K key (in a keyed scheme)
` number of message-blocks
m message
m[i] i-th message block
m̂ message outputted by the Extractor
M message space
M encoded message
M [i] i-th encoded message
Mj [i] i-th encoded message on Proverj
M∗ encoded message space
n number of provers
N codeword length
Pi proving algorithm of i-th Prover
q order of underlying finite field
r response
rM response vector for encoded message M
S tag (in a keyed scheme)
succ(P) success probability of proving algorithm
R∗ response code
Γ challenge space
γ number of possible challenges
∆ response space
ϕ column sparsity of a matrix
ρ response function
τ privacy threshold
ζ row sparsity of a matrix
Table 2: Notation used in this paper
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